Cold War Essay

In the atomic number 63an theater of operations for WWII, the confederate victory and the Axis loss resulted in unprecedented destruction of the parsimoniousness of the region. The Americans felt that the join States had a purpose to work for the revival of the European economy along the lines of political and social factors that could every(prenominal)ow free countries to leave (qtd. in May par. 2). The sweep of such(prenominal) a purpose on into a solid commitment was not perceived or hoped for at the outset. In the United States the Executive branch (including the State Department) and the US sexual relation were often at odds about what to do about the European stinting situation.But there was agreement that the aftermath of WWII must not come to throw away a result in any carriage like the economic conditions that prevailed after WWI (Marshall jut Par. 7). It was initially felt that the United States involvement in European recovery would not be high-priced or time con suming. It was thought that Europe and especially the United state and France with their colonies, could pull themselves back up in short order (Marshall Plan par. 4). The cold passs after the war did not help the situation.The worst winter in a century was experienced in Europe in 1946-47 (Kunz par. 5). There was high unemployment, aliment shortages, and strikes. In particular, the food shortages sparked humanitarian and respite efforts among various organizations. The new United Nations sponsored much of this effort and it was almost all funded by the United States (Marshall Plan par. 11). Not enough of this was organized hale enough or in great enough amounts to do to a greater extent than than to briefly alleviate the problem. American troops in Europe likewise lent a hand in repair and refugee work.For the long term, the food shortages could be chit-chatn to keep on occurring since the traditional source for supplies for Western European had come from Eastern Europe (Ju dd East-West Trade par. 2). After these winters of food shortage, it was proper apparent that a divided Europe was becoming the norm. The awareness of such a division was not generally acknowledged prior to these rasping winters. President Truman entered the United States into some bilateral agreements intending to militarily aid Greece and Turkey.These countries could be seen as being in East Europe. They were facing subversive efforts by communists to take over those countries. For Western Europe, some thought the Morgenthau Plan could be used (Marshall Plan par. 13). This plan supposed massive war reparations could be extracted from Germany to restore the countries other than Germany. There was also the Monnet Plan (Marshall Plan par. 13) which proposed more punishment of Germany since France would hold the Ruhr and Saar coal regions for French purposes.On a stringently monetary front the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 established the International Monetary lineage and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for loans to European nations (Kunz par. 7). The funds make available for these loans were proving to not be of the necessary magnitude. It had been assumed that the international economic system was sound and that an initial infusion of monetary aid would do the trick. But even more was needed. The American agricultural production was unimpaired, the aim of manufacturing output was unprecedented, and the American gold reserves were safe.An outlet was needed to prolong and use the economic prowess of the American transition from wartime to domestic and unlike consumption. The economic plan for a reconstruction of Western Europe, if needed, could borrow from the upstart Deal experience as the American response to the Great natural depression had been accomplished. Early in 1947, evidence of a recession brewing in the United States turned some economists attention to a need to assure European purchases of American goods.The A mericans did not want to see continued European wartime controls and plans which had placed the idea of a continuance of control and regulation by European governments as conclusive. Many in Europe were looking to the Soviet Unions central planning controlled by the state. The Soviets were reporting very high growth rates with the prospect of prosperity just around the corner (DeLong and Eichengreen 11). The Americans had not successfully concluded a war in Europe to end fascist totalitarianism and oppression only to then see a different brand of tyranny and oppression in its place.This threat was perceived to be the communists, Soviet or otherwise. The Soviet influence was directly felt on Eastern Europe. The American administration felt that, for Western Europe, an economic union would be needed. These nations would have to be on the same page if they were not to go communists or be controlled by communists. Accordingly, on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall spoke of th e need to promote free institutions in Europe through their damages with American aid (Marshall Plan, par. 15).